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Hidalgo v. District Court
124 Nev. Adv. Op. 33
(May 29, 2008) 1
CRIMINAL LAW – AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE; DEATH PENALTY

Summary
Petitioner Luis Hidalgo III, awaiting a capital murder trial, successfully made a petition
for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the alleged aggravating circumstances
(solicitation to commit murder) as not being “a felony involving the use or threat of violence to
the person of another” as required by NRS 200.033(2)(b). Although the court found the other
aggravating circumstance, murder to receive money, to be in violation of SCR 250(4)(c)
requirements, the court decided to allow the State amend its notice of intent to seek the death
penalty to cure the deficiency. 2
Disposition/Outcome
The Nevada Supreme Court granted the petition in part, striking the two aggravating
circumstances alleging solicitation to commit murder as prior violent felonies pursuant to NRS
200.033(2), but also allowed the State to amend its notice of intent to seek the death penalty to
clarify the pecuniary gain aggravator.
Factual and Procedural History
Luis Hidalgo III is awaiting trial on one count of conspiracy to murder Timothy Hadland,
one count of first-degree murder for Hadland’s death, and two counts of solicitation to commit
the murders of two alleged witnesses to Hadland’s death. The State had filed notice of intent to
seek the death penalty alleging three aggravating circumstances: the two solicitation counts as
prior felonies involving the use or threat of violence to another person and a third aggravator
alleging the murder was committed to receive money. 3
On December 12, 2005, petitioner moved the district court to strike the State’s notices of
intent. The district court heard argument on the motion in March and September of 2006 and
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The original opinion, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 59 (Dec. 27, 2007), which was withdrawn on February 21, 2008,
fully granted the petitioner’s writ and struck the State’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty, rather than giving
the State the opportunity to amend.
3
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033 lists the circumstances by which murder of the first degree may be aggravated. Here,
the State’s notice of intent suggests that the first two aggravators (the two solicitation to commit murder counts) fall
under 2(b): “A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another…” and the third aggravator
falls under (6): “The murder was committed by a person, for himself or another, to receive money or any other thing
of monetary value.” Id.
2
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denied the motion from the bench on September 8, 2006. The original petition challenged that
district court ruling. On December 27, 2007, the court issued an opinion granting the petition for
a writ of mandamus, which the court subsequently withdrew on February 21, 2008, pending
resolution of a petition for rehearing. The court granted the rehearing petition and this opinion is
issued in place of the court’s prior opinion.

Discussion
Aggravators one and two: solicitation to commit murder as a prior felony involving the use or
threat of violence under NRS 200.033(2)(b)
The question presented is whether solicitation to commit murder can serve as a priorviolent-felony aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(b). The court narrowed the
question to whether the solicitation of a violent crime can be considered an offense involving the
threat of violence to the person of another. 4 On the one hand, the court noted that solicitation is
criminalized because it carries the risk of leading to the consummation of a crime. On the other
hand, the court had already stated that a risk or potential of harm to others “does not constitute a
‘threat’ under NRSW 200.033(2)(b).” 5
To answer the question, the court relied upon decisions from Florida and Arizona that
concluded that solicitation to commit murder cannot support an aggravator based on a prior
felony involving the use or threat of violence to another person. The Supreme Court of Florida,
in Elam v. State, concluded that “violence is not an inherent element” of solicitation. 6 In Lopez
v. State, a Florida appellate court reasoned that the crime of solicitation does not itself involve a
threat of violence. 7 The Supreme Court of Arizona concluded in State v. Ysea that solicitation to
commit aggravated assault could not support the aggravating factor of a prior felony involving
“the use or threat of violence on another person” because the statutory definition of solicitation
did not require an act or a threat of violence as an element of the crime. 8
The underlying reasoning that the court adopts from these cases is that the violent nature
of the crime being solicited “does not transform soliciting murder into threatening murder within
the meaning of the statute.” 9
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The court noted that the crime of solicitation to commit murder is defined in NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.500(2) and
that the elements of solicitation do not involve the use of violence to another, regardless of the crime solicited.
5
Redeker v. District Court, 108 Nev. 200, 202 (1992) (quoting People v. Miley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 347, 352 (Ct. App.
1984)).
6
See Elam v. State, 636 So. 2d 1312, 1314 (Fla. 1994).
7
See Lopez v. State, 864 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). “’The gist of criminal solicitation is enticement’ of
another to commit a crime. No agreement is needed, and criminal solicitation is committed even though the person
solicited would never have acquiesced to the scheme set forth by the defendant. Thus the general nature of the crime
of solicitation lends support to the conclusion that solicitation, by itself, does not involve the threat of violence even
if the crime solicited is a violent crime.” Id. at 1152-1153.
8
See State v. Ysea, 956 P.2d 499, 502 (Ariz. 1998).
9
Hidalgo v. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 33, 9 (May 29, 2007).

2

The court determined that the California and Oklahoma cases 10 the State cited in support
of allowing solicitation to commit murder to maintain a prior-violent-felony aggravator were not
on point. Additionally, the court distinguished this case from Weber v. State in which two priorviolent-felony aggravators based on sexual assault of a minor were upheld, even though the
elements of sexual assault do not include the use or threat of violence. 11 In Weber, the court had
concluded that the evidence showed “at least implicit” threats of violence were perceived by the
minor and enabled the sexual assaults to occur.12 Here, the court noted that there were no
allegations that the petitioners made threats of violence, implicit or explicit, that were perceived
as such by the intended victims. 13
Aggravator three: murder to receive money or any other thing of monetary value under NRS
200.033(6)
The petitioners also asserted that the State did not satisfy the requirements of SCR 250
that requires the State to specifically allege all aggravating circumstances it intends to prove and
to specifically allege the facts on which the State will rely to prove each aggravating
circumstance. The court concluded that while the notice in this case included a number of
specific factual allegations, the repeated use of “and/or” “undercut” the required level of
specificity and therefore the State failed to provide a clear statement of how the facts support the
aggravator.
The court noted that when a notice connects a string of facts with “and/or,” it permits the
finding of the aggravator based on any of the facts taken separately was well as together.
Therefore, if the State pleads its notice in this fashion, each separate fact must support the
aggravator, not just any of the facts taken together. The court concluded that the notice in this
case failed in this regard because the State’s alleged factual allegations supporting this
aggravator are in an “incomprehensible format” such that it fails the due process requirements of
SCR 250(4)(c).
Rather than striking the notice of intent to seek the death penalty because it was not in
compliance with SCR 250(4)(c), 14 the court decided to allow the State to amend the notice to
clarify the factual allegations. In doing so, the court distinguished this case from the only other
published decisions in which it struck notices of intent to seek the death penalty that were also
not compliant with SCR 250(4)(c). 15 Notably, the court expressly limited its holding in Redeker
v. District Court 16 to the particular facts and circumstances in that case.
10

See Woodruff v. State, 846 P.2d 1124 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); People v. Edelbacher, 766 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1989).
See Weber v. State, 121 Nev. 554 (2005).
12
Id. at 586.
13
Judge Maupin took exception to this finding in his dissent, stating: “I do not read NRS 200.033(2)(b) to require
that such a “threat of violence” must be perceived by the intended victim. Rather, I understand the aggravating
circumstance to encompass a threat of violence that is communicated to another regardless of whether the threatened
victim is aware of it.”
14
Striking the State’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty because of non-compliance with SCR 250(4)(c) is
exactly what the court pronounced in its original opinion of Dec. 27, 2007, withdrawn Feb. 21, 2008.
15
The court has published only two other cases in which it stuck notices of intent to seek the death penalty that were
not compliant with SCR 250(4)(c) – Redeker v. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 164 (2006) and State v. Dist. Ct. (Marshall), 116
Nev. 953 (2000).
16
Redeker, 122 Nev. At 127.
11
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Conclusion
Solicitation to commit murder is not a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
person of another within the meaning of the death penalty aggravator defined in NRS
200.033(2)(b). Further, when the allegations in a notice of intent to seek the death penalty are
strung together with “and/or,” then each separate fact must support the aggravator, not just any
of the facts taken together. Therefore, in this case, the first two aggravators (two counts of
solicitation to commit murder) failed because they did not meet the statutory requirements.
Although the third aggravator failed due to lack of specificity in the allegations, the court
concluded that allowing the State to amend the notice of intent to cure this deficiency would not
violate Hidalgo’s due process rights. Ergo, the court granted the petition in part to strike the first
two aggravators, but also allowed the State to amend, as to the pecuniary gain aggravator, its
notice of intent to seek the death penalty.
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